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ported by the results of the four federal cases concerning tax classification of un-
incorporated professional associations-all four were held correctly classified as
corporations for federal tax purposes.57
This view is specifically supported by the conclusion of the court in the most
recent case in this field, Foreman:
The principles upon which the plaintiff relies are of relative long standing,
dating back as they do to the Pelton case, and seem to have been widely ac-
cepted, and this court feels constrained not to depart therefrom.58
The acceptance of these principles of taxation by every court to which the
problem has been presented points strongly to the possibility of future victories
for professional men.
Gary H. Anderson*
57Another victory for an unincorporated association was in Facey Medical Group
v. United States, Civil No. 69-9-S, S.D. Cal., 1962. The Internal Revenue Service had
required the association to pay partnership taxes. After trial, but before an opinion
was handed down, the Department of Justice ordered an administrative refund.
58 Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134, 137 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
* Member, Second Year Class.
TAXATION OF ALIMONY
The number of California divorces granted per year has risen approximately
ten thousand per decade.' In addition, Californians obtain divorces outside the
State, and among those moving to the State are persons already divorced. Ali-
mony, property settlement, and child support payments are concepts with which
the California attorney will almost inevitably have to deal. A significant problem
upon which he may have to advise his client is the incidence of income tax upon
such payments.
In 1942 Congress added sections 22(k) and 23(u) to the Internal Revenue
Code.2 These sections provided for a new treatment of payments "in the nature
I STATE OF CALwoIRNA ECONOMIC DEVELOpMENT AGENCY, CAiFORNIA STA'TLsI-
cAL ABSaAcr, 51 (1963).
2Until 1942, alimony payments were not deductible by the payor nor taxable to
the payee unless the divorce decree completely terminated the formers liability for
support and maintenance under the applicable state law. Pearce v. Commissioner, 315
U.S. 543, 546 (1942); Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69, 75 (1940); Helvering v. Fitch,
309 U.S. 149 (1940); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 8 (1935); Gould v. Gould,
245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917). In one state an ex-wife could qualify for tax-free alimony,
while her counterpart in a state where there was no post-marital support obligation
bore a tax burden. The husband's liability to his former wife (or wives) under divorce
decree(s) plus his own tax liability could leave him little or nothing for his own
support. HARNmcS nEFORE =rn CoMMrrTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS OF = HoumS OF
REPRESENTATrVEs ON REENUE REVISION OF 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 1 at 92
(1942). This often hurt the wife indirectly, for her ex-spouse, knowing he could not
claim a deduction, would naturally tend to be less generous.
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of or in lieu of alimony or an allowance for support."3 The intent of Congress was
to treat such payments as income to the party who actually received them and
to grant the payor a deduction. The amendments were also designed to produce
uniformity in the tax treatment of such payments despite the vagaries of state
law concerning the "existence and continuance of an obligation to pay alimony."4
To be taxable to the wife, the payments had to be made (1) subsequent to
a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, (2) periodically, and (3) in dis-
charge of a legal obligation imposed on the husband by the decree, or an instru-
ment incident to the decree, because of the marital or family relationship. The
payments must not have been "fixed" for child support. If a principal sum pay-
able by the husband were specified in the decree or instrument, it would be tax-
able to the wife only if made in installments extending over a period of more than
ten years from the date of the instrument or decree. In this case the payments
would be treated as periodic to the extent that the amount payable in one year
did not exceed ten per cent of the principal.5 To be deductible by the husband,
the payments had to be taxable to the wife.6
In 1954, the Internal Revenue Code was again revised. The House of Repre-
sentatives proposed to extend the same sort of tax treatment to couples who
separated without obtaining a decree of separate maintenance and who did not
file a joint return. 7 The Senate insisted that this new provision apply only to
agreements executed after the effective date of the revised code, so as not to up-
set existing financial arrangements. 8 It further required that the coverage ex-
tend to payments for support and maintenance received under any type of de-
cree.9 On the whole, the treatment remains the same,' 0 although the atrociously
long paragraph of section 22(k) was subdivided for clarity."
At first glance these provisions appear to be straightforward. However, a
moment's contemplation raises a number of distressing questions. For example,
the reader will note that the code provisions do not use the words "alimony" or
"property settlement," yet he will recall that these words are the most common
ones used to describe the payments covered by the section. The reader may also
inquire as to the nature of an obligation imposed "because of the marital or family
relationship." Consider the following cases.
Problem
Riddell v. Guggenheim
After a period of separation, the parties executed a written "Property Set-
tlement Agreement." In 1953 the wife won a California divorce which became
final in May 1954. Both the interlocutory and final decrees incorporated the
3H.R. EP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942).
4 Ibid.
5INT. REv. CODE oF 1939, § 22(k), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816 (1942).
6 INT. RFv. CoDE oF 1939, § 23(u), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 817, (1942).
7H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 & A21 (1954).
8S. REP. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1954).
9 Id. at 11. This extended the coverage beyond decrees of divorce and separate
maintenance.
1o INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71, 215.
11H.R. R P". No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A2 (1954).
NOTES
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terms of the so-called property settlement, which, inter alia, provided that in
consideration for the execution of the agreement and "by way of property settle-
ment and not as alimony" the husband would pay the wife 250 dollars a month
starting in March 1954 and continuing for sixty months. The husband's obligation
would terminate on the death or remarriage of the wife. Each party relinquished
all rights to alimony for support and maintenance. The wife surrendered her
interest in certain personal property. The husband made twenty-four payments in
1954 and 1955 but did not claim a deduction. He seeks a refund of the taxes paid.
The federal district court held that the periodic payments were made in ex-
change for a property interest and were not in discharge of a legal obligation
arising out of a marital relationship.' 2 Under California law, the payments were
not for suport or maintenance, and the wife could therefore not have obtained
a modification. Having waived alimony, she could not thereafter secure pay-
ments for support and maintenance. The payments were therefore held not de-
ductible by the husband. On rehearingl1 the court reversed itself, found that the
entire community property was worth less than 3,000 dollars and had been equally
divided by provisions in the agreement other than -those for the payment of
money, concluded that the payments were made for support and maintenance,
and held that they were in discharge of a legal obligation arising out of the
marital relationship and were therefore deductible.
On appeal' 4 the circuit court found that there was insufficent evidence to
support the findings that the community property was worth less than 3,000 dollars
or that the property was divided equally. Therefore the conclusion that the wife
gave up no property in return for the monthly payments was erroneous.15 In
addition, the payments made prior to the final decree were not deductible because
under California law the parties were not divorced until the final decree. 16 On
remand,17 the district court concluded that the payments were made in exchange
for the surrender of the wife's interest in the community property. The husband
was therefore denied a deduction.
Taylor v. Campbell
After a period of marital discord, the parties executed a written 'Property
Settlement Agreement." In 1950, a Texas court granted a divorce that approved
and incorporated in its decree the so-called property settlement. The agreement
provided that it was intended to be a final settlement and divison of the com-
munity property, community property rights, and separate property and to be
an accounting between the parties. In complete settlement and satisfaction of the
wife's community property rights and the indebtedness of the husband or of the
community to her private estate, the husband agreed to pay 200 dollars per month
unconditionally until 1954 and thereafter until death or remarriage of the wife.
12 Guggenheim v. Riddell, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9558 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
13 Guggenheim v. Riddell, 59-1 U.S. Tax Cas. g 9158 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
14 Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960).
15 Id. at 845.
16 Id. at 843.
17 Guggenheim v. Riddell, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9149 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
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Each of the parties surrendered certain personalty to the other. In the first arti-
cle of the agreement, the wife acknowledged that under Texas law she had no
right to support but had only a right of accounting as to her property rights. Fur-
ther, she acknowledged that the agreement was not intended to provide for post-
marital support. The husband did not deduct the payments made from 1957
through 1960, and he sought a refund.
A federal district court sitting in Texas, citing the appellate court decision
and the final district court decision of Riddell v. Guggenheim, concluded that no
support payments were intended or provided for under the agreement.' 8 The court
found -that alimony is "illegal" under Texas law and concluded that, because there
was no continuing obligation arising out of the marital relationship, the payments
were made in exchange for the surrender of property rights by the wife and there-
fore not deductible.
On appeal,19 the circuit court said that the labels attached to the agreement
by the parties or by the decree do not control tax determinations. It was found that
nothing in the record but the terms of the agreement indicated that the wife had
any greater property interests than those compensated for by the provisions in
the agreement other than the periodic payments.20 The court held that the refusal
of Texas law to recognize an obligation to pay alimony did not prevent the con-
struction of these payments as support payments because of the intent of Congress
to create uniformity of treatment despite variations in local law.21 The purpose
of the payments was found to be support, and the trial court was therefore re-
versed.
One court has remarked, "So far as possible, and particularly with respect
to questions of federal taxation, there should be uniformity of decision among
the circuits. ' 22 The agreements in Riddell v. Guggenheim and Taylor V. Campbell
are virtually identical, so that one would expect the same results to have been
reached. Yet, the cases seem to conflict, at least where the deductibility of the
payments by the husband is concerned. However, it must be determined whether
the reasoning used by the courts does in fact conflict. If so, a solution must be
found.
Form of Payments
To be taxable to the wife and deductible by the husband, payments must be
periodic, as opposed to payments of a lump sum or installments on a principal
sum.23 If they are subject to contingencies such as the death or remarriage of
either spouse, so that no definite principle sum is owed, this requirement is satis-
18 Taylor v. Campbell, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. g1 9406 (N.D. Tex. 1963).
19 Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964).
20 Id. at 845.
21 Id. at 846.
2 2 Prewett v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1955), reversing 22
T.C. 270 (1954).
23INT. BREv. CODE OF 1939, § 22(k), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816 (1942).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a).
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fled.24 The payments in both Riddell v. Guggenheim25 and Taylor v. Campbell6
were, in fact, subject to those contingencies.
To be within the 1942 code amendments, the payments had to be made under
a decree of, or written instrument "incident to," divorce or separate mainte-
nance.27 The instrument need not be incorporated into or referred to in the de-
cree,28 provided it is incident to the status of divorce or separate maintenance. 29
The agreements in both our principal cases were, however, incorporated into
the divorce decrees, so that there was no question of incidence.30
The payments are also required to be made after the decree of divorce or
separate maintenance.8 1 Where a divorce is concerned, the theory is that a
contractual or court-imposed liability is created to replace the obligation of sup-
port and maintenance that had existed during the marital relationship. Therefore,
the only payments taxable to the divorced wife are those made after the marital
relationship has been completely severed.32 Where the parties remain man and
wife after an interlocutory divorce decree, payments made between the inter-
locutory and final decrees are not taxable to the wife.33 In Taylor v. Campbell34
the payments in question were all made subsequent to the final decree. In Riddell
2 4 Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369, 370 (2d Cir. 1953), reversing in part,
17 T.C. 1610 (1952). Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1953),
reversing in part, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1167 (1952); Davidson v. Commissioner, 219
F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1955), modifying, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1111 (1952); Burton
v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 121 (D. Utah 1956). Myers v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d
448, 450 (9th Cir. 1954), reversing, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1163 (1952), even held
that where the agreement provided for monthly payments for six years whether the
wife remarried or not, no principal sum was specified. This seems overly technical, for
the sum was calculable from the face of the agreement and was subject to no con-
tingencies. It should not be necessary for the agreement to follow a ritualistic pattern
of announcing a total sum payable under a system of installments from which that
sum is obviously otherwise specifiable. See I.R.C. MEe. § 1.71-1(d) (3) (1957).
25 Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1960).
26Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 1964).
2 7 IrNT. REv. CoDE OF 1939, § 22(k), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816 (1942).
The reader will note that with obligations imposed after the date of enactment of the
1954 amendments need not be incident to a decree at all, but, as in Taylor v. Campbell,
pre-1954 obligations are still being litigated, so the prior law is still of importance.
28George T. Brady, 10 T.C. 1192, 1198 (1948).
2 9 Newton v. Pedrick, 212 F.2d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1954), reversing, 115 F. Supp.
368 (D.N.Y. 1953); Holt v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 757, 758 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 982 (1955).
3o Riddell v. Guggenheima, 281 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1960); Taylor v. Campbell,
335 F.2d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 1964). The agreement need not be incident to a divorce
or separate maintenance if it is executed after August 16, 1954. INT. REV. CoDE- OF
1954, § 71(a)(2).
31
1zNT. REv. CoDE oF 1939, § 22(k), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816 (1942);
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a)(1).
82 Commissioner v. DeWitt, 277 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1960), reversing, 31 T.C. 554
(1958).
3 Alice Humphreys Evans, 19 T.C. 1102 (1953), aff'd, 211 F.2d 378 (10th Cir.
1954).
34335 F.2d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 1964).
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v. Guggenheim3 5 a deduction for payments made after the interlocutory decree
was denied, but -those payments were severable for tax purposes from those made
after the final decree.
Marital Obligation
Except in their headings, sections 22(k), 23(u), 71(a), and 215 do not use
the term "alimony." They do, however, require that payments which are taxable
to the wife and deductible by the husband be made "in discharge of (or attrib-
utable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, in discharge of) a legal
obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed on or
incurred by the husband .. ..,'6 The code sections themselves do not supply a
guide to the nature of this obligation, but the congressional reports indicate that
the payments described are to be "in the nature of or in lieu of alimony regardless
of variance in the laws of different States concerning the existence and con-
tinuance of an obligation to pay alimony."37
Alimony is normally considered as a provision for the support of -the wife.38
This is distinguishable from a property settlement, for a "true" property settle-
ment makes a determination of the rights of the parties with respect to joint
and separate property and does not contain a support agreement.3 9 It is believed
that Congress intended to make this distinction in drafting sections 22 and 71.
The reader is referred to the Congressional reports:
[Slection [22(k)] applies only where the legal obligation being discharged
arises out of the family or marital relationship in recognition of the general obli-
gation to support, which is made specific by the instrument or decree. This
section does not apply to that part of any interest in the property so transferred,
which interest originally belonged to the wife, unless she received it from her
husband in contemplation of or as an incident to the divorce or separation
without adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, other than
the release of the husband or his property from marital obligations.40
Where the interest in the transferred property was acquired by the wife under
community property laws, it is possible to say that the interest arose because
of the marital relationship. However, this interest is still essentially an interest in
35281 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1960). If the agreement had been within INT.
REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 71(a)(2) or 71(a)(3), by having been executed after August
16, 1954, this would not have been a material problem.36 rIN. REv. CODE: OF 1939, § 22(k), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816 (1942).
INT. REv. CoDn OF 1954, § 71(a).
87H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1942); S. RP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942) (emphasis added).
38 17 AM. Jur. 72.
3935 A.L.R. 2d 712, 713. Contra: William M. Haag, 17 T.C. 55, 58 (1951).
40H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942); S; REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1942). The last sentence is ambiguous. Grammatically, the phrase
"unless she received it from her husband" must refer to the nearest, precedent, neuter
noun or pronoun, i.e. "interest." However, if the sentence is considered in context, the
wife is surrendering the interest and is receiving the payments. Thus, the sentence must
refer to payments made only in consideration of the release of the husband or his
property from the marital obligations. Such is the nature of a property settlement.
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property and was received by the wife by force of law, and not from her husband
in contemplation of divorce. In addition, the obligation being discharged by pay-
ments in settlement of community property rights does not arise out of a general
obligation to support but arises out of a division of property by co-owners. It is
the agreement executed for the wife's support, not that executed as a property
settlement, which was intended to be within the coverage of sections 22(k) and
71.
However, it is seldom that an agreement incident to a divorce will be either
a "true" property settlement or an ideal alimony agreement. A single agree-
ment may be labeled a property settlement but also provide for custody of the
children, determine which party will pay attorneys' fees, and require the husband
to make periodic payments. In such a case, the court must ascertain the nature
of the obligation satisfied by the periodic payments.
41
Apparently, the policy of the Tax Court is that, in absence of evidence to
the contrary, a classification of the payments made by the agreement will control.42
In Tuckie G. Hesse,43 petitioner was granted an absolute divorce under the
law of Pennsylvania, 44 and the husband had no post-marital support obligation.
However, the parties had executed an agreement requiring -the husband to make
monthly payments for the support and maintenance of the wife and children.
45
The Tax Court refused to be bound by state law. The payments were in the
nature of alimony, were intended to remedy the lack of alimony under local law,
and were made subsequent to a decree of divorce to which the agreement was in-
cident. Therefore the wife was taxed. The intent of Congress to provide for
uniformity of treatment was clearly recognized and carried out.
46
This intent is controlling in the application of sections 71 and 22(k) to
specific problems. As stated in Lyeth v. Hoey,
In dealing with the meaning and application of an act of Congress enacted in
the exercise of its plenary power under the Constitution to tax . . . it is the
will of Congress which controls, and the expression of its will, in the absence
of language evidencing a different purpose, "should be interpreted so as to give
uniform application to a nationwide scheme of taxation" [citation]. Congress
establishes its own criteria and the state law may control only when the federal
taxing act by express language or necessary implication makes its operation de-
pendent upon state law.47
Not only is the state's classification of the payments not binding on the tax-
payer or the federal government, but also the labels attached to the payments by
the parties to the agreement do not estop them from denying the validity of
41 E.g., Scofield v. Greer, 185 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1950), affirming, 89 F. Supp. 75
(W.D. Tex. 1950).
42 Evidence to the contrary was found insufficient in Frank J. DuBane, 10 T.C.
992 (1948), where payments were held not deductible by the husband, and in Bettye
W. Hobbs, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 15 (1963), where payments were held taxable to
the wife.
437 T.C. 700 (1946).
44 Whereby a wife is not entitled to receive alimony if she wins an absolute divorce
but is permitted alimony under a limited divorce from bed and board, without the
ability to remarry. See Hooks v. Hooks, 123 Pa. Super. 507, 187 At. 245 (C.P. 1936).
45 Tuekie C. Hesse, 7 T.C. 700, 704 (1946).
46 Id. at 706. See also Brown v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
47 305 U.S. 188, 194 (1938).
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those labels for tax purposes.48 The terminology used by the parties is merely
evidence of their intent and is not controlling.49 In addition, where the agree-
ment or decree indicates that the payments are both in settlement of property
interests and in satisfaction of the husband's duty to support and maintain his
wife, such an ambiguity may be explained by parol evidence.50
There may be strong indication that the payments are made in settlement of
property rights. For example, an agreement executed in Texas, where there is no
post-marital support obligation, may nonetheless require monthly payments despite
a statement that it has been executed in settlement of property rights and a re-
quirement that the husband convey realty and personalty to the wife and repay
a loan made by her. Yet if the parties to the agreement did not calculate the
amount of property constituting the wife's share, it cannot be said that the
periodic payments were given only in consideration of her property interests,
so the payments may be held to be deductible by the husband.51
If the property interests surrendered by the wife are approximately equal
in value to the real and personal property interests and debts assumed by the
husband, or other consideration, -the periodic payments may be concluded to have
been made in consideration for the waiver of the right to support.5 2 It is un-
realistic to suppose that the wife would waive that right without consideration.5
Even if it is shown that the agreement did settle the property rights of the par-
ties, and even if the periodic payments were intended to settle those rights, it
still may be shown that the parties also intended to fulfill the support obligation.
5 4
If such a duality of purpose is proven, it is reversible error for the court to fail
to determine the extent to which the periodic payments were in settlement of
property rights and to fail to apportion the tax liability of the husband and wife
on that basis.55
48 Clyda T. Jones, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1385, 1389 (1961); Ann Hairston Ryker,
33 T.C. 924, 929 (1960).
49 John Sidney Thompson, 22 T.C. 275, 282 (1954).
5o Campbell v. Lake, 220 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955), reversing, 54-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
i" 9135 (1954). The government was neither a party nor a privy of a party to the
agreement, so the parol evidence rule does not apply. Scofield v. Greer, 185 F.2d 551,
552 (5th Cir. 1950), affirming, 89 F. Supp. 75 (W.D. Tex. 1950). That an agreement
describes payments on a note as settlement of an indebtedness incurred during the
marriage does not preclude introduction of parol evidence that the note was in discharge
of alimony. Landa v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 431, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1953), reversing, 11
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 420 (1952).
51 Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361, 368 (1949). The parties were still married when
the agreement was executed, so the wife had a right to support at that time. She ex-
changed that present legal right for a future contractual right to support. There was
therefore an obligation which arose because of the marital relationship and because of
which the contractual obligation was incurred.
52 Floyd H. Brown, 16 T.C. 623, 631 (1951), acq., 1951-2 Cum. BUL. 2.
53 Julia Nathan, 19 T.C. 865, 872 (1953).
54 Where agreement stated that payments were in compensation for all the wife's
claims for support, but a subsequent state court decree held the payments to be in
settlement of the wife's interest in the business enterprise of the husband, the govern-
ment was allowed to demonstrate that the husband also intended to discharge his marital
obligations. United States v. Solterman, 163 F. Supp. 397, 399 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
55 Solterman v. United States, 272 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1959), reversing United
States v. Solterman, supra note 54.
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Valuation in the agreement of the wife's property interest and the fixing of
the sum of the payments at or near that value is relevant in determining that
the payments are made in consideration of the wife's interest.5 6 The nature of
the property, -the interests in which are settled by the agreement, is also re-
levant. If the property is divisible, but one party has a greater "concern" for it
and a greater ability to use it than the other, as with a controlling share of capi-
tal stock in a company previously managed by the husband, the awarding of
that property to the "interested" party indicates that payments were given in
exchange for it.5 7 A failure to make the payments contingent upon the death or
remarriage of either party is also indicative of a property settlement.5 8
The physical location within the agreement of the obligation to make the
periodic payments may also indicate the parties' intent. One section of the
agreement may require periodic payments for support and maintenance while
another provides for the conveyance of property interests from the wife to the
husband. The latter may also require the husband to execute notes payable at
regular intervals. The structure of the agreement thus indicates that the notes
were executed in consideration of the conveyance, and they are therefore not
deductible -by -the husband.59
The testimony given by the husband and wife as to their intentions is
weighed against -the other evidence even if the parties contradict each other.60
The failure of -the husband to mention the subjects of support, maintenance, or
alimony during the negotiations over the agreement is, with the terms of the
agreement, evidence that only property interests were exchanged for the pay-
ments.61
A provision reducing the amount of the payments if the payments are ever
held taxable to the husband has been used to support the contention that the
parties intended the payments to fall within section 22(k) or 71 and that they
therefore considered the payments to be for support and maintenance. 62
Even if the payments are shown to be in the nature of or in lieu of alimony,
they must still conform with the requirement of periodicity, and installment pay-
ments will be severed from the periodic payments for the purpose of taxation.63
56 John Sidney Thompson, 22 T.C. 275, 282 (1954). Compare Thomas E. Hogg,
supra note 51.
57 John Sidney Thompson, supra. Compare Floyd H. Brown, supra note 52, where
indivisible oil drilling equipment was given to the husband.
58 John Sidney Thompson, supra at 283. Compare Scofield v. Greer, supra note 41,
Landa v. Commissioner, supra note 50 and Ann Hairston Ryker, supra note 48, where
there were such contingencies, indicating that the payments were for support and
maintenance.
59 Joseph S. Freeland, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1460, 1464 (1960); Miriam F.
Schwartz, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 509 (1954).
60 Jesse W. Wilson, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379, 383 (1961); Floyd H. Brown,
16 T.C. 623 (1951), acq., 1951-2 Cum. BuLL. 2.
61 Scott v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D. Ore. 1963).
62 Ann Hairston Ryker, 33 T.C. 924, 929 (1960), where the agreement provided
for payment of a percentage of the gross income of the husband if it were taxable to
the wife but only a percentage of his net income if it were taxable to the husband.63 William M. Haag, 17 T.C. 55, 59 (1951). This writer agrees with the result of
that opinion but disagrees with the statement made therein that the term "alimony"
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
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Thus, we can see that many factors may be taken into account in determining
the intention of the parties as to the consideration given for the periodic pay-
ments. No one of them has been said to be controlling over all the others, nor has
any particular combination of them been said to defeat another combination. It
is with this uncertainty in mind that we must determine the nature of the obli-
gation discharged by the payments in Riddell v. Guggenheim and Taylor v.
Campbell. Let us consider the latter case first.
The Taylor agreement itself labeled the payments as a property settlement.
It allocated household goods, personal possessions, and an automobile to the
wife and reserved all other property, including fifty-one per cent of the stock in
the husband's advertising business, to the husband. The wife acknowledged in
the agreement that she was not entitled to alimony under Texas law. These factors
all indicated that the payments were intended to be in settlement of community
property rights. However, the payments were also contingent upon the death or
remarriage of the wife, indicating that they were intended for support and main-
tenance. To resolve this ambiguity, parol evidence was admitted. There was no
indication that the property interests of the wife were of any greater value than
the rights she acquired under the agreement other than the periodic payments.
The circuit court therefore concluded that the district court's finding that the
payments were only in consideration of the property rights of the wife was
error.64
In light of the historical treatment of this issue by both the Tax Court and the
judicial courts, the conclusion seems correct. However, the government raised
the argument that state law ought to apply because under Texas law there is no
legal post-marital obligation of support. This argument was rejected; the court
accepted the rule first laid down in Tuckie G. Hesse65 that the differences be-
tween the states as to the existence of a duty of support after termination of a
marriage could not control in the case of federal income taxation.6 6 Again, on
the basis of past decisions, the conclusion is correct.
The circuit court in Riddell v. Guggenheim also admitted parol evidence to
resolve the ambiguity between the label of the agreement and the effect of the
contingencies of death and remarriage. 67 The husband and wife gave conflicting
testimony as to their intentions in executing the agreement. 68 If the community
property had been divided equally, there was no consideration for the periodic
payments, and the payments could be considered to have been for the wife's
support. Since the court resorted to California law to determine the extent of the
community, the presumption that property acquired during the marriage is com-
munity property was invoked.69 There was no evidence in the record to rebut this
presumption or to support the finding that the community was equally divided.
includes payments in settlement of property rights. See note 38, supra, and Joseph S.
Freeland, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1460, 1464 (1960).
64 Taylor v. Campbell, 334 F.2d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 1964).
65 7 T.C. 700 (1946). See text accompanying note 43, supra.
66 Taylor v. Campbell, 334 F.2d 841, 846 (5th Cir. 1964).
16 Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836, 840 (9th Cir. 1960).
68 Id. at 839.
69 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 162-64.
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The inconsistency between the two cases is now apparent. In all respects save
one the cases are identical. In both Riddell and Taylor the payments are periodic,
the agreements are incident to a divorce, the payments are subsequent to a de-
cree of divorce, and the courts require that the payments not be made ii settle-
ment of property interests. The cases differ on the influence of state law on
deductibility
r.7
The concept of community property exists only where it has been continued
by statute, and the rights and interests of the parties in community property will
differ from state to state.72 It has been said that in the absence of specific federal
statutes the law of the local jurisdiction will determine the separate or community
nature of property. 73 However, as with most generalizations in law, this must be
qualified. Such a rule will not apply in every situation. Busher v. Busher74 was an
action to quiet title to federal homestead land in Washington acquired by the
plaintiff while he was married. His children claimed an interest in the land after
the death of his wife. In holding that the Washington community property law
applied, the Supreme Court said that once title passed from the federal govern-
ment the realty was subject to state control in the absence of special federal
legislation.
In light of the rule announced in Lyeth v. Hoey75 that in federal taxation state
70 Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836, 842 (9th Cir. 1960).
71 Riddell v. Guggenheim is not the only decision in this field that has utilized state
law to determine deductibility. E.g., in Estate of Frances B. Willson, 16 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 375 (1957), the settlement agreement stated that it had been executed in settle-
ment of both the property rights and the rights to support and maintenance of the wife,
but it did not categorize the payments as being for one or for the other. The amount of
each payment was contingent upon the employment and earnings of the husband, and
the Tax Court found that the payments were in discharge of a marital obligation because
under state law the measure of the liability to make support payments is generally the
ability of a husband to pay. However, when the government contended that California
law would not classify these same payments as alimony because they were not con-
tingent upon the death or remarriage of the wife, so that the estate of Frances Wilson's
former husband should not receive a deduction, the district court refused to consider
state law on the ground that the deductibility of payments under federal tax laws does
not depend upon the characterization of the payments by the state. Brown v. United
States, 121 F. Supp. 106, 108 (N.D. Cal. 1954). Where a state court had found that
certain periodic payments were in consideration for the wife's interest in community
property, the Tax Court concluded that neither the state court nor the parties could
have intended the payments to be in discharge of an obligation arising out of the marital
or family relationship because of a lack of a post-marital duty of support under local
law. Jesse W. Wilson, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1961). The court did not mention
the cases following Tuckie G. Hesse.
72 See generally 4 PowL, REAL PoPERTr 676 ff. (1964); 2 D.- FuNIA, Plu-
cn'L-s oF ComiuNrry PaoPERTY 526-618 (1943).
73 15 Am. JuR. 21) 829.
74231 U.S. 157 (1913).
75 Supra, note 48.
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law may control only when federal law makes itself dependent upon state law,
the applicability of state community property law to actions to quiet title may
readily be distinguished from its applicability to actions arising under the In-
ternal Revenue Code. Where the tax laws are to be governed by local community
property law, they have generally said so explicitly.
76
It is contended that decisions such as Riddell v. Guggenheim which rely upon
state law for the determination of rights under the Internal Revenue Code sec-
tions dealing with alimony are improperly reasoned when they do so other than
to ascertain the marital status of -the parties. Such decisions conflict with the
intent of Congress to provide a uniform system of taxation -throughout the
country and with the tenor of most decisions on the subject.
77
This is not to say that the decision in Riddell v. Guggenheim was wrong. It
may well be that there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the
property interests surrendered by the parties were consideration for each other. If
so, it would be in conformity with the expressed purpose of the code sections to
conclude that the periodic payments were made in consideration of the surrender
of property interests and were therefore not deductible by the husband. However,
local community property law should not have been used to establish a presump-
tion that the property interests of the wife were greater than those found by the
district court and to require the husband to rebut such a presumption or fail in his
suit. These interests would not have accrued to the wife in the majority of
jurisdictions, and to allow them to control determination of tax liability in eight
states is anomalous.
To rely upon community property laws in such a case and for such a purpose
is to allow the law of a minority of jurisdictions to control an otherwise uniformity
applicable system of taxation. This not only defeats the purpose of sections
22(k), 23(u), 71, and 215, but it is also contrary to acknowledged standards of
income tax interpretation.
Jerome Sapiro, Jr.*
76E.g., INT. RE:v. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2523(f), 2056(c)(2)(B), and 1014(b)(6),
respectively dealing with gift, estate, and income taxes.
77 645 CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAx REaP. fr 4606.246 cites Morgan v. Commissioner,
309 U.S. 78 (1940), in support of a "principle that state law controls in determining the
nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer has in property and that the federal tax-
ing statute designates what interests or rights created by state law shall be taxed." But
this is not inconsistent with the contention advanced here, for that opinion went on to
say at page 80: "If it is found in a given case that an interest or right created by local
law was the object intended to be taxed, the federal law must prevail no matter what
name is given to the interest or right by state law." CCH also cites United States v.
Dallas Nat. Bank, 152 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1945), but that was not a determination
of the rights of the United States under its tax laws but was a determination of whether
or not a lien may attach to the type of interest a delinquent taxpayer had in a trust, and
that determination rested on an interpretaion of the rights of the beneficiary under the
trust instrument in light of local law.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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